Voters are gonna vote

 A further explanation is needed on the Tamil voter behavior.

1. Tamil voter behavior is best understood by the voter turnout than the absolute number of voters

Number of eligible voters change in every election cycle.   Technically, the voter base should increase as there has been a net increase in population.  Natural disasters ( 2004 Tsunami ), war, etc could have a gross negative impact .  But the voters showing up at the polling stations, as a percentage of registered electors, show a behavioral pattern.  A higher turnout rate could be signs of mobilization, excitement, etc. A lower rate could indicate apathy, boycott or even situations like the bad weather as it is happening now.

Looking at the number of people voted is misleading.  Percentage of eligible voters is a better metric. Percentage removes the variability explained above. It highlights the voter's collective intent.  The reason 2013, 2012  registered electors list in the North and East is lower than the 2010 needs a different explanation. What is important is why, historically, only less than 50% of the voters in these provinces turn up to vote in presidential elections.

2) Tamils didn't boycott the 2005 Presidential elections.

There is gross misrepresentation that Tamils boycotted the 2005 Sri Lankan presidential elections.  They did not.  36% of the voters in the North and East voted in 2005. In the two previous elections Tamils voted in similar rate. No one talks about a boycott in those elections. In 1994, the turnout was 37% and in 1999 it was 46%. Perhaps Tamils had been boycotting the elections all along.

So why do the press and many others selectively harp on a 2005 as a boycott and assign the blame to the Tamils for the Mahinda win?

It is true that LTTE made statements saying that election was for the Sinhala people to decide their leader. And in 2005, Sinhala people essentially deadlocked.  There is a big qualitative difference between enforcing a boycott and endorsing a candidate.  If LTTE really did enforce a boycott, then the Tamil people defied it.  Then the same people should be gleeful about this defiance. Had the LTTE asked people to come out and vote for Ranil, the turnout rate would have certainly increased.  But they had to turn up in historically higher numbers to ensure a Ranil win.

Was that a reasonable expectation ?

LTTE could not have endorsed an executive presidential candidate  standing for a unitary constitution while it is in the midst of a negotiation to change it.  Ranil made no promises to restructure the state from the current unitary state.  He made no such attempt EVEN after the 2002 Oslo declaration. The Sinhala people deadlocked in that election because Sinhala voters didn't support him enough. Yet, the blame is put on the Tamils ( as a bigger narrative ) that they boycotted. The accusation is that the Tamils did not work harder than the Sinhalese to elect Ranil.  

Let us also look at another data point.  In 1994, CBK enjoyed a lot of support among the Tamils for her “peace” platform.  There were Chandrika bangles being sold in temple festivals and there was a lot of hope. LTTE also tactically played along by not saying anything.  Yet, only 37% in the North and East were motivated enough to come out and vote. May be the other 63% foresaw the kind of peace that awaited them. They were proven right within an year.  

The 2005 boycott narrative is no different than calling the LTTE’s taxation an extortion. It is an exercise in delegitimacy.  

What the west couldn't get LTTE to do in 2005, can now, in 2015, be done by Delhl.

Despite what the Sinhala voters do, despite what the candidates themselves say, it is the Tamils who have to prove their worth by turning up en masse and voting for the lesser evil.

Tamils will be asked to repeat the unsuccessful strategy of  2010 again.  It is time for the Tamils to play again the loosing game of "head I win, Tail you lose".

All about that base

 As expected, write ups about the role Tamils should play in the upcoming Sri Lankan presidential election are starting to pop up.

A previous post highlighted the fallacy of Tamils trying to play a “national” role in Sri Lanka. This post further illustrates the same point using the Sri Lankan presidential elections.

Here are the key patterns of voting in the presidential elections since 1982.

1. Since 1982, one in two eligible voter in the Tamil region chose to ignore the Sri Lankan Presidential election.  The voter turnout in the North and East, in every election since 1982, has been less than 50%. 

voter turnout percentages in North & East and the rest of the island

Note: You can draw your own conclusions on if Tamil non-participation in the 2005 election was any different than the other elections. While the turnout was the lowest, it was not significantly different than other elections. It was a consistent pattern and 2005 was not an exception. 

2. Tamil votes have the potential to determine the outcome only when the Sinhala vote is split in half. This happened in 1988 and in 2005.  

The table below shows the the total votes the candidate won the election by and the number of votes he/she received from the North and East.  

For example, in 2005, keeping the turnout to be the same, if half of the Tamil people who voted for Rajapakse switched their votes for Ranil, Ranil would have won. If more Tamils had switched their votes in 1988, Premadasa would have lost. 

The election outcome has to come down to within about 500K votes for a Sinhala candidate to worry about the Tamil votes. If he feels he can get a wider margin than that among the Sinhalese, then there is no need to appeal for the Tamil votes.  The catch 22 for the Sinhala candidates is that they can not be seen as actively soliciting the Tamil votes for fear of loosing more Sinhala votes. They hope that the Tamils hate the other candidate bad enough that they come out and vote against that candidate.  It doesn't even matter what their position vis a vis Tamils is. It is not a surprise Sirisena does not want to do any thing to seek or earn the Tamil votes.  He might even be praying that TNA does not come out and endorse him openly. He knows Tamils had been voting against Rajapakse even with out any prodding. 

How does the election math work in a close election?

Let us use the 2010 election data.  The total of registered voters was ~14m.  In the North & East, it was ~2m and outside of Northeast it was ~12m  .   

So 500K is ~ 3.6% of the total eligible national voters.

This number means significantly different things along ethnic lines. 500K is ~ 25% of the Tamil eligible vote. But it is only about 4% of the Sinhala eligible vote.  But if you map it to the historical turnout rate, it actually means ~50% of the Tamils votes cast and ~5% Sinhala votes cast.

So what can a Sinhala candidate do to convince 25% more Tamils to turn up and vote for him? Or does he spend his energy on convincing 4% more of the Sinhala voters to support him?

The obvious thing to do is to appeal to the smaller percentage Sinhala voters. Because cost of acquisition for equivalent Tamil votes is much higher than the 4% Sinhala votes.  Even just attempting to appeal to the Tamil votes, comes at a penalty.   The chart below shows the growth of the actual voters in the North & East and the rest of the island.  So the cost of acquiring 4% Sinhala vote is becoming less and less over time because the total available voter pool is growing. The Tamil vote has flatlined for last 38 years. 

A clear indication that a close election would drive an even more hardline campaign for the Sinhala votes.  This is a good example of why the mean voter theory doesn't work across the ethnic divide in Sri Lanka. National , Presidential,  elections in Sri Lanka mimic the local, primary elections in the US where the candidates only cater to their own bases. Not to a "moderate national mean voter".  

In Sri lanka, Sinhala voter is the national mean voter.  

What Options do Tamils have?

 Whenever there is a popular Sinhala Candidate and/or a very weak opposition candidate, there are no real choices for the Tamils. Their votes do not matter when the margin of victory is higher.  Nothing meaningful is gained by Tamil parties endorsing either candidate.

If Tamils anticipate a close election, then Tamils votes do matter. Tamils can use that to send a clear message. That window of opportunity does exist in this upcoming election.  A Tamil message will be far more meaningful in this election given other parallel events and timelines. 

If a Tamil party were to also field a good candidate who can run on a platform of self determination, it can potentially trigger interesting dynamics.

1. It would energize the Tamil voter base and increase the turnout in the Tamils candidate's favor. 
2. A Tamil vote to such a candidate can act as a precursor to an eventual referendum and strengthen the case for it.  This adds importance given the anticipated release of the UN report in March of next year.
3. If indeed there is a real split in the Sinhala vote, coupled with a higher Tamil turnout, it can potentially deprive the leading Sinhala candidate from reaching the needed 50% goal post.  In such a scenario, Tamil’s 2nd preferential votes could help determine the winner.  And the Tamil party can still endorse a Sinhala candidate as that 2nd choice. A regime change achieved this way is far better than being pawns in other's agenda. The end goal is the same but the means are different. 

 But do Tamils have leaders who can take such bold steps?  

Clamoring to champion “national” issues does nothing to safeguard Tamil interests.  Eventually, regime Change will be achieved not because of Tamils but despite of Tamils.  Tamils were needed only to start the process not to finish it.   Will the Tamil leadership take its own base for granted and loose all options?  We don't have to wait too long to find out. 

Until then, people of the island may have to sing along to a different interpretation of the pop song that is popular now. Sadly, it is a more intelligent tune than the one Tamil leadership is currently singing. 

Because you know

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base, no middle

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base, no middle

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base, no middle

I'm all about that base

'Bout that base