Hate the game. Not the Player

 This is a revision of a previous post. That was written as a critique of the TNA policy. Highlighting the folly in TNA aspiring to be a “national” party.  Using the same principle, this revision tries to highlight why Tamils or Muslims can never expect justice from the current Sri lankan system.  

The principle of median voter theorem is that politicians would move their positions to that of the median voter , in order to gain more votes. A useful tutorial is here . This leads to moderating positions or middle paths.  Specially at federal or national level politics.

It is fashionable in liberal circles to search for such a phenomena even when none exists. Sri Lanka is an example of this. Many wrongly assume a normal distribution for the whole island and search for that single median voter who represents both a Tamil and a Sinhalese. You will never find one. In Sri lanka, the Sinhala median voter and the Tamil median voter are in completely different “bliss points”. This fundamental truth is ignored. The structural ( Constitutional, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary ) domination of Sinhala opinion is deeply entrenched in the current Sri Lankan system. So much so that a Sinhala politician ( or any person of power ) will never have to be accountable to a Tamil or Muslim voter.  

Sinhala leaders lose nothing for ignoring Tamil or Muslim plights. On the other hand, if they are seen as catering to Tamil or Muslim sentiments, they risk loosing the Sinhala voters to the right of the Sinhala median voter.

The Muslim people’s inability to get wider Sinhala political support for their plight will suffer the same fate as of the Tamils.

Some quick illustrations below  to show the distribution of views on the ethnic conflict.  

The naive ( or idealistic ) view shown above is that the opposite views of a Sinhala voter in favor of unitary state and a Tamil voter in favor of TamilEelam would converge in the median as a federal solution. This is repeated by some NGOs as well as very few Sinhala liberals. And this view is almost always directed at the Tamils to convince them to keep trying within the existing system.  

Even the basic math will show someone that the best case distribution may look like the one below. and it is the “Sri Lankan” view.

The numerical strength of the Sinhalese will skew the distribution to the right.  History shows the Sinhala median voter is at the right of 13A.  Happy in the current status quo of 13 minus.

My hypothesis is that Tamils and Sinhalese are on their own, decoupled, distributions. And those individual distributions were different during the war and after the war.  A consolidated illustration is below

When the LTTE was militarily strong, the Tamil mean voter “ideal point” would have been closer to TamilEelam and consequently the mean Sinhala voter “ideal point” would have been near 13A. or 13 A plus.  But post war scenarios have both shifted as well as altered the distributions. The Tamils, constantly reminded of defeat, have shifted lot more towards the federal middle. But the Sinhala state, through triumphalism, has consolidated itself near the narrow band of unitary structure.

As repeated in this blog, those asking the Tamils to work things out within the current system and the process, never acknowledge the impossibility of it.  They now stand exposed by their inability to make any meaningful change to the system even when TNA obediently listens to them.  What history does not teach them, may be math can. 

As the illustration above shows the Sinhala leaders have no incentive to cater to Tamils or Muslims. TNA or Tamils don’t gain anything by moving their position to the right of the scale.  Are the Muslims also in their own distribution that is not aligned to the two above?  If so, do they overlap more with the Sinhalese or with the Tamils?

There is nothing Tamils or Muslims do or say that will incentivize the Sinhala median voter to move to the left to meet Tamils halfway as the median voter theorem dictates.

Few Sinhala liberals want to change the player ( regime change ) but keep the game as is. Changing of the player is rather easy. Things have already been set in motion in that regard.

But the game is permanently set in favor of the Sinhalese, and to be specific, in favor of Sinhala- Buddhists.  The permanent and absolute majority of Sinhala-Buddhists has been structurally enshrined. Thus Sinhala-Buddhist can unilaterally decide the destiny of the island. And they can do so under the semblance of a democratic process.  The Sinhala parties ( as the current government has) have gained supermajority needed for restructuring the state.  But that majority was always used to entrench the hegemony even further. The Sri Lankan constitution written in such a way that it does not even trust the super majority political party with the structure of the state. Even a super majority party can’t restructure the state without a referendum where a majority of Sinhalese have to consent. This steady, hegemonic, entrenchment employed parallel tracks , stripping away any protection constitution offered ( Soulbury ) to non Sinhala-Buddhists. It reduced Tamil participatory means and criminalized Tamil aspirations ( 6A, PTA). This process has now reached the conclusive end of Tamils facing the hobson’s choice of either assimilate or be eliminated.  It is only a natural progression that the Muslims will also face the same choice. In a true, participatory democracy, there are structural protections against majoritarian abuse.  Only in Sri Lanka, the permanent, absolute, and unassailable majority, put structural protections and backstops in place to ensure it can never be any other way. It is the game that produces a player like BBS.

So if the Tamils or the Muslim continue to dream of a better political future under the current setup, then it has to stay a dream.  

Part 2: Remember to Remember

 Part 1:  5 yrs on. Remember to Remember 

LTTE Calculus

Sivaram was worried that the Eelam struggle was increasingly becoming a test bed to try out different Counter Insurgency (COIN) campaigns.  He started discussing this with friends and was hinting at it in his writings.  RAND publications, now released in public domain, bear witness to his worries.  Many of the RAND’s National Defense Research Institute papers are sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Below are few examples of recent research releases where LTTE was used as case study.

“Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare”,

“Subversion and Insurgency. RAND Counterinsurgency Study. Paper 2”

and “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. RAND Counterinsurgency Study. Paper 3”

Furthermore,  right after the ceasefire, Sivaram was openly skeptical about the peace process and started warning about the “Peace trap”.  LTTE became concerned about Sivaram’s position and invited him to Vanni.  Sivaram visited the LTTE heartland for the first time in 2003 ( Unsure about the exact time) and met with the LTTE leadership.  He was engaged by LTTE on their strategy at some considerable depth during that meeting.   

This had an impact on Sivaram and his writings afterwards. LTTE’s strategy lead him to coin the term Counter - Counter Insurgency or as he called it CCI.  

He, later, became frustrated again that the LTTE was not “educating the people about the truth”.

By 2000, LTTE realized it had achieved the necessary level of strategic parity through military means.  Any further military expansion towards Jaffna risked a direct intervention by India. Any further advances would have also been hampered by the threat to its rear supply line in Vanni. All heavy war material needed to be brought in from Vanni, a  required element to sustain any large scale incursions into Jaffna.  LTTE would have incurred heavy casualties. Not to mention the Tamil civilian casualties in the peninsula.  This strategic pause also paid off when Sri Lanka launched the Agni Kela offensive in Apr and failed.  Sri Lankan military literally threw everything it had into that battle.  At this juncture of parity, and followed by the airport attack in July, Sri Lankan state was left with limited options. It had to pursue peace.  

The objectives of the American Department of Defense review, and the LTTE’s offer of peace coincided in 2001.

LTTE was aware of the peace trap yet it was determined to stay with the process.

LTTE’s immediate and short term goal was to consolidate and preserve the strategic parity it had gained.  LTTE calculated it can exit the peace process at an appropriate time with that parity recognized as inevitable, and as the  “new normal”.  LTTE was worried that Sivaram’s public position about the “peace trap” would create doubts in Tamils mind.   

Pre-Peace Process

LTTE invested heavily in the people of Vanni.  It was creating a lasting Vanni mindset: A mindset that was intimately tied to the LTTE’s state building project.  As Sivaram learned, LTTE made that investment as an antidote to counter insurgency tactics as well as a long term strategic springboard.  At that time, many of the counterinsurgency tactics of the Srilankan government was indeed starting to bear fruits in the East and in the Jaffna peninsula. Tamils in those areas were starting to accept the state violence as normal. And also accept the loss of dignity.   They were willing to accept limited violence in-place of mass violence such as indiscriminate shelling and air raids. Constant military presence, disappearances, targeted killings, no freedom of movement, were rationalized as a price to pay for not having indiscriminate violence . Those who did not know how to “stay out of trouble” had it coming the logic went.  This was an erosion of their will to resist. Exactly the desired outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign.      

In the Vanni, LTTE created areas of full control. It invested heavily in projects of statebuilding: Projects that gave people a sense of dignity, safety, and limited freedom of movement.  Before that meeting, Sivaram saw those projects as waste of precious resources during the time of war. He was of the opinion that, as a direct consequence of state building, LTTE focused too much on expanding conventional capabilities and on protecting territory. Sivaram was convinced that it came at the expense of its successful guerrilla roots.   But the witnessing of statebuilding, and the lived experience, has left an everlasting impression on the Vanni people as well as on the visiting diaspora.  That investment paid off as an unflinching loyalty to the LTTE even in the dying days of the war.

LTTE depended on that process during the peace process to counter any moves to weaken the bond between the people and the organization. It must be mentioned that it is because of that Vanni mindset, that the survivors of the war were made to suffer in the concentration camps. It was a pre-planned counterinsurgency exercise to dehumanize them.  To make them forget the dignified Vanni life.  Even Though Sivaram did not live to see the outcome of the LTTE’s Vanni mindset project, he understood the ramifications of it in 2003.  

  During Peace Process

LTTE devised several other strategies during the peace process to ensure Sri Lankan state and its backers did not drive a wedge between them and the people.  As part of the counterinsurgency campaign, practitioners plan out the twin approaches of “legitimacy building” of their side and of “de-legitimizing”  of their opponents.  This delegitimacy campaign is targeted at different types of audience.  In the case of LTTE, it was primarily aimed at the Tamil people in the island and abroad.  LTTE  was already handicapped by the terrorist label. As mentioned in part 1 about the Aug 2002 visit of Deputy Secretary Armitage (who held one of the key leadership roles in the US DoD review) the following wiki leaks info sheds some light into what was happening. key word emphasis is mine

  “The Deputy Secretary.. noted that the US

bureaucracy has moved very quickly in response to GSL

requests for assistance in the areas of intelligence,

security, trade, investment, and aid...   He

noted that the intelligence team (septel) and a team from the

Peace Corps are in the country. He stressed that the

US could not serve as an "honest broker" between the GSL and

the terrorist LTTE (as some people wanted),..”

Deputy Sec. Armitage was very direct with the Tamil clergy and others when they met him in Jaffna. He made it clear which side the US backed in the peace process.  It was the reality but it was also an intended message to undermine the legitimacy of the LTTE in the eyes of the people.  

TNA was formed in Oct 2001 in a pre emptive move to consolidate the Tamil political space.  Primarily to deny any opportunities to delegitimize the LTTE.

LTTE also organized a series of Ponguthamil events to keep the people highly mobilized and motivated.  This mobilization was key to consolidate the support even in the peninsula where LTTE had very limited presence before the peace process.  Sri Lankan state later targeted and killed many of those involved in organizing the Pongu Thamil events.

LTTE also saw the calls for democratization by allowing multi political parties through a counterinsurgency lens. And resisted those suggestions.

As mentioned in part 1, the US DoD looked at “under governed areas with in states” as a security risk while LTTE was bent on consolidating the Vanni under its control.  

It should be noted, many of LTTE’s actions for parity ( thus legitimacy) were bitterly opposed by the Sri Lankan state.  According to Dr. Sandra Destradi’s research, this is was one of the primary reason for the failure of the peace process. By undermining its hard won parity, it also took away the incentive for LTTE to continue negotiating.  Few actions of the delegitimacy campaigns are worth highlighting.

1) Holding of the Donor meeting in DC knowing LTTE can not attend

2) Denial of visits to the Vanni areas to Koffi Annan and to President Clinton after the tsunami

3) Abrogation of PTOMS

4) Framing the LTTE taxation as extortion or as ransom.  (Many Tamils fell victims to this campaign).

There were also accusations that few of the current TNA leaders were undermining the LTTE’s strategy to prevent delegitimacy campaigns.  They are accused of telling the foreign delegations in private meetings that LTTE should not be given the political legitimacy as it is a military organization. And that the political space should be the preserve of the TNA.

In anticipation of international pressure tactics on its associates ( As India did with the deportation orders of Anton Balasingam and Nadesan Satyendra in the 80’s ) and to prevent infiltrations, LTTE re organized its international operations.  Many long time associates, including KP, were intentionally sidelined. And its international coordination was moved to and controlled from the Vanni.  It was both a tactical necessity and as well as a strategic move that further reinforced the centrality of Vanni, forcing dignitaries to make the trek to the Vanni.  

Sivaram also learned about two of LTTE’s secretive divisions.  One was the “Defense Planning and Military Science Division” under Sasi master and the other was the “Strategic Planning Division” under the coordination of Mano master who previously was the head of “Military Training school”.  

Again, reverting to part 1, where as the US DoD saw the  “adoption of asymmetric approaches “ as a challenge to be dealt with in the new century, LTTE doubled downed on its black tigers as the “asymmetric deterrence” against any possible foreign intervention.  Sivaram wrote an article in May 2004 under the heading “LTTE develops asymmetric deterrence to stall foreign intervention” .

LTTE considered its reaction to the Indian intervention in 87 a tactical failure.  While LTTE knew ( Purportedly through its close friendship with the TN chief Minister MGR ) of the plans for Indian intervention in 1986 , it thought it had preempted it by banning the TELO.  It did not continue to maintain a tactical plan for such an eventuality.  Now, Sasi master was tasked with such strategic scenario planning.  According to Sivaram, LTTE had tactical plans in place to handle limited foreign intervention as well as for any possible rebellion in the east.   

As Katunayake Airport attack demonstrated and later the Anuradhapura air force camp attack reinforced, LTTE had elevated the suicide attacks to full unit level deployments which was never done before.  LTTE saw that as a core part of their strategic deterrence.

And by the end of 2005, while trying to prevent de legitimization, and while developing a deterrence, LTTE also simultaneously sought to undermine the “legitimacy building” of the UNP government.  Under the cover of international safety net, Ranil’s government was endowed with more legitimacy. There were open and public warnings from the US leaders ( Nicholas Burns, Ashley Willis, etc) to the LTTE about the cost of returning to war. So when LTTE “engineered” the defeat of the Ranil, and by letting a “Hawk” win the election, it reduced the “legitimacy” argument.  Today, that regime is accused of Genocide, War crimes, and Crimes against humanity. The international players are unable to openly endorse the conduct of the war.  Had Ranil won the election in 2005, the war still would have resumed.  The outcome may still have been the same.  But the conduct of the war and the narrative would have been different.

Next:  Post peace process.  Was Genocide anticipated ?