A good way to set up for the new year is to recap some of last years posts. Some think I single out TNA leadership instead of appreciating the difficult task they are doing under tough conditions. TNA did step up to the plate when Tamil people needed them the most. But criticism isn't necessarily opposition. I try my best to present ideas through different analytical frameworks. Game theory models have become popular tools to deal with areas of conflict: Be that economic, social, or political. This is an attempt at a recap of my last year’s TNA centric posts through a game theory model.
The context of Tamil strategic thinking.
A new song by a coincidentally named band, New Politics, might be an appropriate setup.
Should I believe in the world momma Should I give up and hide or should I stay and fight Should I believe in the rules momma Tell me if I should run or learn to shoot a gun I don't know what to believe momma ………... You won't believe what I've seen momma There's a fire inside there's a storm on the rise It's in the air that we breathe momma Can I speak out my mind in these changing times? Give me a reason to be momma 'Cause I'm down on my knees I'm begging please Help me back on my feet momma 'Cause I need someone to believe believe believe in ……...
Price takers in perfect competition and monopolies don't need to be strategic. But others in conflict must be strategic. With the news about 56 Global Tamil entities releasing a New Year message, TNPF press meeting, and the TNA meeting with the president, talks of TRC, etc, It is useful to look at the current Tamil politics through that model.
Few highlights of the game theory when conflicting parties arrive at an equilibrium.
1) If a strictly dominant strategy exists for one player in a game, that player will play that strategy in each of the game's Nash equilibrium .
2) If both players have strictly dominant strategies, the game has only one unique Nash equilibrium. However, that Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal, meaning that there may be non-equilibrium outcomes of the game that would be better for both players.
3) If only one player has a dominant strategy, then the other is expected not to play in that strictly dominated game.
4) By the similar logic, if both strictly and weakly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated resulting in single strategy for each player, this also is a Nash equilibrium.
Is TNA leadership pursuing a strategy that will result in an (pareto) optimal equilibrium for the Eelam Tamil cause?
A full game theory analysis would include every possible player. So it is important to understand if the International community (mainly India & US) sees any equilibrium arrived at between Sri Lanka and the Tamilnation as a stable one. But for this post, I limit the players to the Srilankan state and the Tamils only. Also to avoid confusion, a state of equilibrium is not necessarily a final state but can be an intermediate state before a process of negotiation begins. So the players can further explore the possibility of another optimal equilibrium state.
A model in political science, known as the median voter theorem, predicts one equilibrium.
Since strictly dominated strategies can’t be played, by a process of iterative deletion, political candidates tend converge on moderate positions in order to maximize the votes.
This works in a setup when the constituents are normally distributed with the median near the moderated positions. An accommodative political framework facilitates this. This is the case in many western political systems. The political process in the US has been a better example of this until the recent phenomena of tea party politics.
But in ethnically polarized and non accommodative political systems, this does not work well. In these cases it is nearly impossible to get a normal distribution, cutting across ethnic boundaries, unless there is a very drastic and disruptive change of the framework itself. The distribution is more of a bimodal one with peaks on each end of the spectrum and with a lot of empty space in between. So the payoff for each player is to move to the median of their own curve instead of wasting their effort to move to the area of empty space. The political process in the island of Sri Lanka can be seen in these illustrations.
Fig 1
the first one is self explanatory. A truly federal setup could be the happy median in an ideal case where the whole island population is normally distributed with bulk of Tamils on the left and the bulk of the Sinhalese on the right. A numerical strength of the Sinhalese would skew this distribution to the right.
Fig 2
The second curve is also self explanatory. This is largely the desired view of the Sri Lankan state. But this also reflects the view of those who see the island through a prism of majority and minority (Ex: India, TNA leaders) and of those who do not subscribe to the ethnic nature of the conflict (Ex: The INGOs, pseudo liberals). People such as Dayan Jeyantilaka often use the logic that the island is one nation and by virtue of the Sinhala majority, what Sinhalese think matters more than the Tamils. As we will see, there is a qualitative and quantitative difference in how one sees the distribution. Because each view drives different game theory strategies.
Fig 3
This third figure illustrates the pre and post war scenarios in my view and is the reality of the conflict. These quick drawings don't show the intent clearly. so to expand on it
While the post war Tamil positions skewed to the right, away from TamilEelam, the Sinhala positions skewed to the right, towards a unitary Sinhala Buddhist state by far more because of the triumphalism. The shift aside, the pre war, wider Sinhala distribution, imposed by limited war weariness, became much more narrower in post war (tighter standard deviations) (Note: Drawing meant to show it as such but it did not come through. Will edit later). A narrower Tamil distribution pre war, hardened by being inside the theater of war (at enormous cost), became wider, post war. Some political party positions are listed just for illustrative purposes.
so If one believes in the 2nd illustration, as opposed to the third, then the payoff for TNA is better if they move more to the right towards the median. But if one accepts the third distribution as the reality, then TNA’s pay off is better if they move more to the left within the Tamil distribution. That offsets TNPF gain and neutralizes Diaspora influences. To the right is empty space anyways.
Sri Lanka has no incentive to move as it has no effective opposition within the Sinhala distribution and has no more to gain in terms of payoff.
My concerns are when TNA leaders use language or strategies that fit the wrong models shown above.
TNA leaders at times aspire to take up the Sri Lankan opposition party mantle ascribing themselves to the 2nd illustration, thus trying to move to the right.
TNA leadership also contradicts the median of the Tamil distribution. By mis interpreting the NPC votes as an endorsement from the Tamils for their strategy of moving further right in this distribution curve.
TNA can take advantage of the strategic asset that is the “Transnational ethnic kinship” , which will make the case for the third illustration even more stronger. If taken as one single entity, this kinship is additive to the distribution. That would make the Tamil normal distribution on the left quantitatively larger. But often the TNA leadership, tries to distance itself from that kinship. Again, putting itself on the wrong curve.
If TNA is interested in playing, then it should understand the playing field.
