A somewhat recent Tamil phenomena of muted reaction to turn of events is at display again in recent weeks. I am not sure if it is primarily due to the inability to anticipate and plan for such events or if it is because of misplaced priority. If it is the latter, it is far more damaging than many think.
Tamil roadmap moves along the hope for an international investigation. David Cameron’s March deadline further reinforced that hope. Few other contradicting positions such as the US and India asking for an internal investigations and full implementation of LLRC or India continuing its “secret military ties with Sri Lanka” , or the new curve ball that is the TRC supported by South Africa seem to bring out varying reactions from the Tamils. Many questioning the timing and the TNA being quite about the developments.
Sinhala nation has always seen the Tamil nation as a bigger enemy than any external enemy. Thus, it is more willing to negotiate and compromise with an external power than with the Tamils. Sinhala nation has been good at developing hedging strategies as demonstrated by its centuries old and impressive history of dealing with colonial occupations (Primarily because it retained a space in Kandy for incubating opposition against colonial powers. Tamils did not have such a space until after the British left) . Sinhala nation has relented and mortgaged its sovereignty when push came to shove in order to retain the option for maneuverability at a later time ( eg: 87).
As mentioned before Sinhala state’s China card is ineffective in terms of military benefits. But for Sri Lanka, China sold an option to delay any binding action through the security council. So, until that option expires, Sri Lanka has more maneuverability in frustrating any other initiatives.
The talks of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with the guidance of South Africa, is an obvious ruse by the Sri Lankan state to hedge against and frustrate the initiative for an international investigation.
How should Tamils respond to such a ruse? It is with a renouncement that such a tactic is untimely. But to request the South African assistance when Tamils are given a chance at justice. So that the victims can define the parameters of reconciliation just as ANC was able to do in South Africa.
What can tamils possibly hope to achieve by entertaining such a TRC initiative prematurely? If it happens, It goes against the notion of strategic negotiation.
A few historical truths are important to understand.
1) Since independence of the island from Britain, consecutive Tamil leaderships have been committed to the Tamil nationalism. And the nationalist threshold has only been increasing.
2) That commitment is largely driven by a very politically conscious Tamil constituency. These constituents took care to maintain pockets of resistance that incubated that political consciousness against many odds.
3) Many attempts to pacify the Tamils, primarily using counterinsurgency tactics, failed miserably.
Given this historical background, one should enter a bargain process only if such an exercise consolidates or preferably increases the space for strategic maneuverability.
In order for one to have that confidence a sufficient and necessary condition should be met. That the people they represent can be mobilized in support of such an initiative.
LTTE met this condition when it entered into the peace talks in 2002. And it showcased the mobilization through a series of Pongu Tamil events. LTTE was given international legitimacy during the peace talks with dignitaries making the the trek to the Vanni and the LTTE officials being invited to the capitals for discussions. But as research shows, LTTE was eventually sidelined by the International community in favor of the Sri Lankan state.
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a previous tweet below
@SolheimDAC @GGPonnambalam her plausibility test shows that IC reduced LTTE's "degree of negotiability" by taking away "strategic parity"
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If TNA miscalculates the reasons for the access it is now receiving from the International players, and if it places too much importance to retaining this access at the cost of neglecting its core strength of retaining the popular support of Tamils, it will end bad for the Tamils.
There are two reasons given by the supporters of this alternate view.
1) That the LTTE made a mistake by not compromising to retain the international access at any cost
2) And TNA is now engaged in preciously that and is waiting for an opportune moment to increase the diplomatic strategic space. And it can then be aggressive.
The first reason deserves an entire write up on its own. But the second reason needs further scrutiny now in light of the TRC discussions.
It is true that the Sinhala Nation has mastered the hedging strategies through diplomatic initiatives. But Tamils, due to structural limitations, and through errors of omissions, were unable to develop and gain parity in that strategic space.
LTTE sought parity through military means. Because it saw that as something feasible over a longer period.
A few now believe that the LTTE employed a very simplistic approach of military means only and that they can go toe-to-toe with the Sinhala nation over strategic diplomacy.
There is absolutely nothing wrong in thinking that as long as the Tamil people remain mobilized and are supportive of that. I do not believe TNA will be able to achieve that for a premature TRC process. Any engagement that delays the International Investigations will only erode the Tamil support base for the TNA. And it will make it much more difficult for the TNA to ever recover from such a mistake. Delaying tactics, as done during the peace talks, is a proven pacification strategy.
And, as said in the beginning, Tamils have incubated greater political consciousness against many odds. If Sinhala nation thinks it can choke out that incubation space through demographic change, it is making another error. Sri lanka ( and to some extent the International community) still fails to comprehend that a parallel incubation space has been created in the diaspora spanning over two generations of Tamils. So that the Tamil awareness can always be kept alive. But sadly the Sinhalasation project has economic and social endorsement from its Sinhala constituency so the project will continue regardless. The economic cost to the Sri Lankan state to maintain that kind of tight, undemocratic, grip on Tamils will make it not tenable in the long run. But the Rajapaksa regime, by integrating the occupation project into a Sinhala economy, has ensured its constituency is supportive of the regime. To the disappointment of the international powers, a popular Sinhala opposition to the regime remains anemic. Erosion of that support base, helped by subtle means of International actions, is still in the making. Until a popular opposition emerges, the International powers will not ratchet up economic pressure risking the destabilization of the country.
Tamil leadership on the other hand needs to retain the popular support. TNA had the common sense to realize and seize the Tamil support at the very last phase of the NPC election. And with Sumanthiran's help, TNA is taking on issues, such as rule of law and freedom of expression: Issues that also matter to the Sinhala nation. This led to a media characterization of TNA as the true opposition party in Sri Lanka. This characterization also serves the international agenda of putting pressure on the regime while also keeping the TNA within the unitary framework of Sri Lanka. The danger though in running behind the international endorsements, and in playing the role of responsible opposition, is that Tamil nationalist concerns may have to be muted. This comes across as ignoring the Tamil people’s political consciousness. International powers, waiting for the popular opposition to the Rajapaksa regime to materialize, will also drop the TNA if it doesn't have the popular support of the Tamils.
If you have the support of a highly mobilized people, then the international endorsement and engagement will follow. But the opposite is not always true.
The Chief Minister’s recent budget speech, after many gaffes, is hopefully a recognition of that urgency. TNA needs to assure the Tamil people in clear terms that it will not be part of any delaying tactic in the form of a TRC. Remaining silent sets the wrong narrative and TNA will put itself in a corner with the Tamil voters and eventually with the International powers.
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